Multiparty computation protocols have been known for more than twenty years now, but due to their lack of efficiency their use is still limited in real-world applications: the goal of this paper is the design of efficient two and multi party computation protocols aimed to fill the gap between theory and practice. We propose a new protocol to securely evaluate reactive arithmetic circuits, that offers security against an active adversary in the universally composable security framework. Instead of the "do-and-compile" approach (where the parties use zero-knowledge proofs to show that they are following the protocol) our key ingredient is an efficient version of the "cut-and-choose" technique, that allow us to achieve active security for just a (small) constant amount of work more than for passive security.
Introduction
In multi party computation (MPC) a set of parties (P 1 , P 2 , . . . , P n ) owns some private inputs (x 1 , x 2 , . . . , x n ) and wants to compute some function f of these inputs in such a way that the output z = f (x 1 , x 2 , . . . , x n ) is correct and even if n − 1 parties are corrupted and cooperate, they cannot learn more information about the honest party's input than what they can learn from their inputs and the output of the computation.
The first solutions for this problem were given by Yao [Yao82] for the two party case and by Goldreich, Micali and Wigderson [GMW87] for the multi party case. Those solutions provide computational security: if we are willing to assume that a majority of the parties are honest, information-theoretical secure solutions were introduced by Ben-Or, Goldwasser and Widgerson [BGW88] and Chaum, Crepeau and Damgård: [CCD88] . An unexpected advantage of the latter kind of protocols with respect to the former, is that informationtheoretical secure protocols are more efficient than the computational secure one, and therefore have been implemented and successfully used to solve real-world problems [BCD + 09], while protocols that are secure against a dishonest majority -and therefore consider a more realistic threat model, and in particular can be used in the crucial two-party setting -are still too cumbersome to be used in real life.
The goal of this paper is to fill this gap and design an efficient protocol for arithmetic MPC secure against a dishonest majority.
Another advantage of the protocols in [BGW88, CCD88] over the ones in [Yao82, GMW87] , is to provide security also in concurrent settings: when we run an MPC protocol over an Internet-like network, we need to be sure that the protocol remains secure also when other protocols are running over the network: in particular, the adversary might use the information that he gets running one protocol in order to break the security of the other one. The universally composable (UC) security framework of [Can01] provides a strong definition of security, and if a protocol is UC secure then we know that it's going to be secure also when arbitrarily composed with itself or other protocols. The protocols of [BGW88, CCD88] are secure also in the UC sense, while the security of [Yao82, GMW87] does not hold in the concurrent case.
We achieve the best of both worlds and present a truly efficient protocol that can be implemented and used in real life, and that guarantees static UC security against any dishonest majority. An earlier version of this protocol, described in [Orl09] , has already been implmenented and tested by Jakobsen, Makkes and Nielsen in [JMN10] , where timings for different level of security and circuit sizes can be found.
The price to pay when designing protocols secure against any dishonest majority is high. First of all, it is clearly impossible to guarantee termination, meaning that even if one single party leaves the protocol, the protocol is going to abort. Also, it is not possible to guarantee fairness for general MPC [Cle86] , meaning that the adversary can see the output and then decide whether to let the honest parties receive their output or not.
Tweaking the model or the definition it is possible to achieve some relaxed flavor of fairness [CC00,Lin08,GMY04] for general MPC. On the other end of the scale, complete fairness has been achieved for a limited class of functionalities in a recent series of papers [GHKL08, GK09] .
Our protocol requires a (small) constant amount of public key operations per gate of the circuit. The protocol has a preprocessing flavor with a first (heavier) preprocessing phase and a (lighter) on-line phase of actual computation. The preprocessing phase is independent of the function to be computed and the inputs.
Informal Theorem 1 Assuming semi-honest multiplication protocols and homomorphic trapdoor commitment schemes, there exist a protocol for arithmetic multi party computation that is UC secure against any dishonest majority.
-If n parties want to preprocess M multiplication gates with security 1 − 2 −s , every party calls the multiplication protocol n(5M + 18s) times. -In the on-line phase, 3 commitments are computed for each multiplication gate.
State of the art: The first solution for MPC with dishonest majority in the UC framework was given by Canetti, Lindell, Ostrovsky and Sahai [CLOS02] : while their construction is an important feasibility result, the protocol is completely impractical due to the use of generic zero-knowledge proofs.
Efficient solutions for MPC over Boolean circuits have been extensively investigated in the past years [LP07,LPS08, NO09, PSSW09] . For the case of arithmetic computation, a step towards efficient solutions has been taken by Cramer, Damgård and Nielsen in [CDN01, DN03] , based on threshold homomorphic encryption: however efficient protocols for the distributed key generation phase are still lacking and the use of homomorphic encryption during the on-line computation makes these protocol impractical.
In a recent work Ishai, Prabhakaran and Sahai [IPS09], following the "MPC in the head" approach of [IPS08], present a protocol for arithmetic computation with characteristics similar to ours, but where the constants involved are significantly bigger. On the other hand, the focus of [IPS09] is on optimizing the amortized asymptotic complexity, ignoring multiplicative constants and low-order additive terms, whereas our goal is to optimize practical efficiency.
Main Ideas
Secret representation: We call a shared commitment a secret-shared value in Z p between the parties: the sharing of a value a is represented by an additive secret sharing of the value a and some randomness r, together with a public homomorphic trapdoor commitment to Comm(a; r).
MPC with a trusted dealer: Suppose there exists a trusted dealer that provides the parties with random triplets of multiplicative shared commitments Comm(a), Comm(b), Comm(c), with c = a · b, and additive sharings of the openings. We will call these commitments to random multiplications together with the sharing of their openings multiplicative triplets or triplets from now on.
Given access to this trusted dealer, the parties can efficiently compute any arithmetic circuit over the field: given that shared commitments are linear (the commitments are homomorphic and the openings additively shared), it is possible to evaluate additions without any interaction. Using circuit derandomization from [Bea91] , it is possible to evaluate a multiplication in the circuit using one of the preprocessed triplets.
The resulting protocol is extremely efficient as the interaction is limited to the opening of a triplets of commitments for every multiplication gate in the circuit, and some local computation. As for security, n − 1 corrupted parties have no information about the honest party's inputs, and cannot force the computation to output the wrong value without breaking the binding property of the commitment scheme.
Implementing the trusted dealer: The main challenge of this paper is to implement the trusted dealer i.e., to generate the triplets in an efficient way. We start from any two party multiplication protocol that satisfies strong semi-honest security. This could be done using homomorphic encryption, OT, or other cryptographic assumptions, see for instance [IPS09] . Intuitively, a protocol is strongly secure against a semi-honest adversary if 1) the security is guaranteed for any choice of the corrupted parties' randomness and 2) the view of the protocol commits the adversary to his randomness and given the view and the randomness it is possible to verify whether any party deviated from the protocol. 1 The main challenge now is to turn this semi-honest protocol into a protocol with security against a malicious adversary in the UC setting. In order to do so, we will employ a kind of cut-and-choose technique reminiscent of the one from [NO09] , that works as follow:
1. First, many random triplets are created. 2. Then, a fraction (say half) of the triplets are checked to detect cheating attempts. The parties randomly select a subset of the generated triplets and disclose the randomness that they used during the multiplication protocol. If any cheating is detected the protocol aborts, otherwise the parties proceed to the next step. 3. If the test goes through, we know that with high probability the adversary didn't cheat in most of the executions of the multiplication protocol. Given that any triplet is checked with probability 1/2, if the adversary cheats in the generation of s triplets the cheating will be detected during the test except with probability 2 −s . So the honest parties can reasonably assume that if the test goes through there are no more than, say 80, triplets that were generated maliciously among the untested ones. For this informal description let's call a triplet good if it was honestly generated, and bad if it was maliciously generated. Given that the protocol to generate the triplets is semi-honest secure, a good triplet will satisfy correctness (c = a · b) and privacy (a, b are uniformly random in the view of the adversary), while a bad triplet might nor be correct nor private. 4. The triplets are checked for correctness: they are paired two-by-two, and a sanity-check is performed. If any bad triplet is found, the protocol aborts, otherwise we know that all the triplets are correct i.e. for every triplets it holds that c = a · b. Every check "burns" one of the two triplets. 5. At this point we know that the triplets are correct, but still the adversary might have some extra knowledge about some of the honest parties' shares: So we combine the remaining triplets in such a way that we can "distill" M fully private triplets from a set of O(M + s) triplets, where s of them might not be private. The way the triplets are combined can be seen as a new and unexpected application of packed Shamir's secret sharing [FY92] . 6. The last step to achieve UC security is, informally, to ask every party to prove knowledge of their shares -thus ensuring input independence. To do that, the parties generate some random homomorphic UC commitments, and open the differences of the triplets and those commitments. Opening the differences between those commitments can be seen as a very simple proof of knowledge.
UC commitments: For the last step of the protocol sketched above, we need some UC commitments that are compatible with the homomorphic commitments used during the MPC protocol. A really easy way to construct UC commitments is to ask a party to provide a commitment Comm(a; r) together with an encryption of its opening. The encryption is relative to a public key in the common reference string (CRS). Therefore, the simulator (by choosing the CRS) can "extract" the commitment by decrypting the ciphertext. Clearly a malicious committer can encrypt something different than the opening of the commitment. To force honest behavior, we use again a cut-and-choose technique. This protocol also has a preprocessing flavor, with a heavier preprocessing phase and a light on-line phase.
Informal Theorem 2 Assuming semantic secure encryption and trapdoor homomorphic commitment schemes, it is possible to implement UC commitments in the CRS model. Higher level operations: Our protocols are designed to be compatible with higher level protocols to perform complex operation such as exponentiation, bit decomposition and comparison in an efficient way -as in [ , is becoming a standard definition if one wants proper security guarantees. The strength of this framework relies in the universally composable theorem, which states that if a protocol is secure in the UC model, then this protocol will preserve the same security even if composed with an arbitrary number of copies of itself or with other protocols. The UC framework provides also a way of designing protocols in a modular way, where every sub-protocol is independently analyzed, as it will be done in this paper. The price to pay for such a result is the impossibility of constructing any non-trivial protocol that is secure in the UC model 2 . In order to develop interesting protocols in the UC model we need some kind of setup assumptions, like a common reference string (CRS) available to the parties, or a key registration authority (KR), that checks that the parties know their secret keys and the public keys are well-formed, or one of many other different assumptions, see [BCNP04,DNO09,LPV09] and references therein.
The UC framework gives us also a way to design our protocols in a modular way: we can design subprotocols for simpler tasks and then combine them in more complex protocols, and still we can prove the security of the sub-protocols independently.
Adversarial model In this paper we consider security against a static adversary i.e., the adversary A chooses the set of corrupted parties before the protocol starts, as opposed to an adaptive adversary that can corrupt the players during the protocol.
We say that the adversary is passive or semi-honest if A follows the protocol but tries to extract some information about the other parties' input from his view of the protocol. We say that the adversary is active or malicious if A is allowed to deviate arbitrarily from the protocol specifications. We will say that a protocol is passive-secure if it is secure against a passive adversary and active-secure if it is secure against an active adversary. In the UC model the adversary, as well as all the other parties involved, are modeled as probabilistic polynomial time (PPT) interactive Turing machine (ITM).
The real world We model a real world execution of a cryptographic protocol in the UC model by defining a PPT ITM Z called the environment, that gives inputs and gets outputs from the parties P 1 , . . . , P n running the protocol. Moreover, Z communicates with A giving instructions on how to attack the protocol. The parties and the adversary usually also have access to some ideal functionality H. In all our protocols we assume that the parties have access to a secure and authenticated point-to-point communication device and some setup functionality.
The ideal world We define also an ideal world, where the parties P 1 , . . . , P n interact with an ideal functionality F, that captures the properties we expect from our protocol. Here the parties get their inputs from the environment Z and simply forward them to F, therefore they are usually referred as the dummy parties. There is also an ideal adversary S, called the simulator, that communicates with the environment Z and with the ideal functionality.
Indistinguishability At the beginning of the protocol all parties, the environment and the adversary are given a computational security parameter κ and a statistical security parameter s. The environment is also given an auxiliary input z. At some point the environment stops and outputs a bit. We use REAL H π,A,Z (κ, s, z) to denote the output of Z in the real world and IDEAL H F ,S,Z (κ, s, z) and REAL H π,A,Z , IDEAL H F ,S,Z the respective distribution ensemble, with κ, s ∈ N, z ∈ {0, 1} * .
and IDEAL H F ,S,Z are computationally indistinguishable in κ, with all but 2 −s probability.
The security offered by the statistical security parameter s does not depend on the computational power of the adversary. Therefore in practice we can set s to be much smaller than κ.
The ideal functionality for the CRS setup assumption is detailed in Figure 1 .
The functionality F D CRS , parametrized by a probability distribution D, has the following command Activation: On input (activate) from all parties, output (activated, crs ← D) and halt. Definition 2. We call a tuple of algorithms (Gen, Comm, TOpen, ) a double-trapdoor homomorphic commitment scheme if: let (ck, τ 1 , τ 2 ) ← Gen(1 κ , p), then the following properties hold:
Statistical Hiding: ∀x, x ∈ Z p and randomness r, let r i = TOpen(C, x, r, x , τ i ) with i = 1, 2 then Comm ck (x; r) = Comm ck (x ; r i ); moreover r 1 , r 2 's distributions are statistically close.
Intuitively we need the commitments to have two trapdoors because we need to argue that even after the simulator opens some commitments towards the adversary using one of the trapdoor, the adversary still cannot break the binding property of the commitment scheme.
In [CD98] it has been shown that trapdoor homomorphic commitment schemes can be instantiated using any q-one-way group homomorphism: this primitive can be built from the discrete logarithm assumption, RSA, and other standard assumptions.
Semi-honest multiplication protocol: The building block of our protocol is any strong-semi-honest multiplication protocol (c 1 , c 2 ) ← π mul (a, b) where a, b ∈ Z p are respectively the first and the second party's inputs,
The two party multiplication protocol can be instantiated using a variety of assumption, like homomorphic encryption, OT, and more. The exact requirements for the multiplication protocol are slightly stronger than the standard definition of semi-honest security. Most "natural" semi-honest multiplication protocol would satisfy this stronger requirement, or can be easily modified in order to do so. Intuitively we need the protocol to be 1) secure also if the adversary chooses maliciously the randomness for the corrupted parties and 2) the adversary cannot cheat during the protocol and then pretend that he behaved honestly, if that instance of the protocol is checked during the cut-and-choose.
More in detail, consider any two party semi-honest secure protocol view ← π(r 1 , r 2 ) where r i is the randomness used by P i . Without loss of generality assume that P 1 is honest and fix his randomness r 1 .
Definition 3.
A protocol π is strongly secure against a semi-honest adversary if π is 1) secure for any adversary that follows the protocol but chooses its random r 2 maliciously and 2) if P * 2 deviates from the protocol π it holds that either a) P * 2 does not break the security of π or b) for all P P T P * 2 : r * 2 ← P * 2 (view, r 2 ) then view = π(r 1 , r * 2 ) with all but negligible probability.
Instantiating The Protocol
In this section we propose a possible instantiation of the protocol with a particular choice for the commitment scheme and the semi-honest multiplication protocol.
Double-Trapdoor Homomorphic Commitment Scheme
A natural instantiation of double-trapdoor homomorphic commitment schemes is given by a Pedersen commitments over a DL group ((G, p, g, h 1 , h 2 ), τ 1 , τ 2 ) ← Gen(1 κ , p) where g, h 1 , h 2 are generators of the group G of prime order p, and h i = g τi . Then Comm ck (x; r 1 , r 2 ) = g x h r1 1 h r2 2 , with x, r 1 , r 2 ∈ Z p . The homomorphic operation is just the group operation i.e. Comm(x; r 1 , r 2 ) Comm(y; s 1 ,
. To trapdoor open (r 1 , r 2 ) = TOpen(x, r 1 , r 2 , x , τ i ) one lets r 3−i = r 3−1 and
Paillier-based Multiplication Protocol
An example of a two party multiplication protocol that is strongly secure against a semi-honest adversary based on additive homomorphic encryption is given here. For completeness we will present the protocol using a specific encryption scheme, Paillier [Pai99] , but the protocol can be instantiated with many other alternatives, for instance [OU98,DGK07,DGK09].
Paillier's cryptosystem Paillier's cryptosystem [Pai99] is an additively homomorphic encryption scheme, whose semantic security relies on the hardness of the composite residuosity problem.
Let pk = N = p · q an RSA modulo be the public key, and sk = λ = φ(N )/ gcd(p − 1, q − 1) be the secret key. Then to compute an encryption of m ∈ Z N , pick r ∈ R Z * N and compute c = Enc pk (m;
It's easy to verify that the cryptosystem is homomorphic modulo N .
In order to achieve security according to Definition 3 we will need that Paillier's ciphertexts are also binding commitments. It turns out that this is the case, when the public key is "well-formed". The next lemma shows that it is actually possible to build a concrete attack if the key is not well-formed. Proof: Let N = p 2 q, then (N, φ(N )) = 1. Then if x = x − pq mod N and r = r(1 + pq) mod N , then Enc(x; r) = Enc(x ; r ).
x − x and s = r /r. The right side has order φ(N ), the left has order N . If gcd(N, φ(N )) = 1 then only element of Z N 2 that has order both N and φ(N ) is 1, and the left hand side is equal to 1 just for y = 0 mod N .
It is possible to efficiently prove that a public key is well-formed by showing that any element of Z N has a n-th root. An efficient ZK protocol for the task is presented in Figure 2 . Proof: From the homomorphic property, it follows that C = Enc pk (α·x+r mod N ). Then from two openings (x, r) and (x , r ), one can compute α = (r − r)(x − x ) −1 mod N .
Implementing π mul Now we all all the tools we need to design a protocol for π mul using Paillier's homomorphic encryption.
As detailed in Figure 3 , P 1 generates a public/private Paillier key pair, then sends the public key to P 2 and proves that N is well-formed. After this step is performed once, an arbitrary number of multiplications can be computed. Note that N has to be much bigger than p, in particular N > 2p 3 . This is a natural requirement when p is the size of a elliptic curve DL group, as in order to guarantee the same level of security offered by an elliptic curve of size 200 bits one has to choose a composite N of size much bigger than 600 bits. Now P 1 sends P 2 an encryption of his input a ∈ Z p . The other party, using the homomorphic property of the Paillier cryptosystem, can multiply b into it and mask it with randomness.
Note that the protocol is not secure against a malicious adversary, as the modulo N of the cryptosystem and the modulo p of the shares and the commitment schemes are different. Then if an adversary is malicious an overflow might occur during the encrypted computation, with the result that the computed shares will not sum up to the product of the initial shares, and the triplet will result incorrect.
P1 has input a ∈ Zp, P2 has input b ∈ Zp. At the end Pi gets ci s.t. c1 is random in Zp and c1 + c2 = a · b mod p 1. P1 generates (N, λ) with N > 2p 3 , and send N to P2 2. P1 uses the protocol in Figure 2 to prove that N is well-formed (these two steps are to be performed once and for all). 3. P1 computes α = EncN (a; r) with randomness r and sends it to P2; 4. P2 chooses d ∈R Z p 3 ; 5. P2 computes and sends β = α b EncN (1; 1) d to P1; 6. P1 computes c1 = Dec λ (γ) mod p; 7. P2 computes c2 = −d mod p; First we note that the view of the protocol commits P 1 to his randomness and input as shown in Lemma 2 and the view of the protocol commits P 2 to his randomness and input as shown in Lemma 3: in particular P 1 cannot find a, a , r, r with a < p ≤ a and Enc(a; r) = Enc(a ; r ) and P 2 cannot find (b, d, b , d ) with b < p, d < p 3 and b ≥ p or d ≥ p 3 and α b Enc(1; 1) d = α d Enc(1; 1) d without breaking the semantic security of Paillier's cryptosystem.
MPC Protocol
In Figure 4 the ideal functionality F AMPC is presented. This ideal functionality allows n parties to input values in Z p , manipulate them (via additions and multiplications) and output the result to a given party. In this description of the protocol we assume that the parties already have secure and authenticated point to point channels, and a functionality for broadcast. Also, following the modular spirit of the UC The functionality FAMPC has the following commands:
Initialize: On input (init, p) from all parties, activate and store the modulo p. Rand: On input (rand, Pi, varid) from all parties Pi, with varid a fresh identifier, pick r ← Zp and store (varid, r). Input: On input (input, Pi, varid, x) from Pi and (input, Pi, varid, ?) from all other parties, with varid a fresh identifier, store (varid, x). Add: On command (add, varid1, varid2, varid3) from all parties (if varid1, varid2 are present in memory and varid3 is not), retrieve (varid1, x), (varid2, y) and store (varid3, x + y mod p). Multiply: On input (multiply, varid1, varid2, varid3) from all parties (if varid1, varid2 are present in memory and varid3 is not), retrieve (varid1, x), (varid2, y) and store (varid3, x · y mod p). Output: On input (output, Pi, varid) from all parties (if varid is present in memory), retrieve (varid, x) and output it to Pi. framework we will implement the protocol in the presence of a "trusted dealer" that gives to the party a public key for the commitment scheme, together with random shared commitments. The ideal functionality describing the behavior of this trusted dealer is detailed in Figure 5 .
The functionality Frand has the following commands.
Initialize: On input (init, p) from all parties, activate, generate a key for a double-trapdoor homomorphic commitment scheme ck ← Gen(1 κ , p) with plain-text space Zp and send ck to the parties. Req. Share: On input (share, sid, ai, ri, Pi), with sid a fresh identifier, create and output a shared commitment Comm ck (a, r) with a = ai, r = ri. Figure 5 . The ideal functionality that models Frand
Notation and Library
We will call a shared commitment of x (and write [x]) the following configuration: P i , i = 1, . . . , n owns x i ∈ Z p , r i in the commitment scheme's randomness space RC and Comm ck (x; r), where it holds that x = n i=1 x i mod p and r = n i=1 r i . For convenience we define a library of commands that the parties can perform on shared commitments. Call H, C respectively the sets of honest parties and the set of corrupted parties. H∩C = ∅ and H∪C = {1, . . . , n}. Finally |H| ≥ 1. In Figure 6 some basic commands are introduced and in Figure 7 some advanced commands are defined.
On-line Phase
As mentioned our protocol has two phases: the preprocessing phase described in Figure 10 produces many random triplets, and in the on-line phase the triplets are used to implement the ideal functionality F AMPC : the on-line protocol, detailed in Figure 8 , is quite simple. Parties provide inputs and compute multiplications by opening differences between random commitments generated during the preprocessing and the actual values of the computation. The security of the protocol intuitively follows from the fact that the random preprocessing material is used to mask the actual values of the computation. Also, when a value is opened, the presence of the commitment prevents cheating parties to force a wrong output value.
Share Secret: To share an element x ∈ Zp, choose random x1, . . . , xn−1 ∈R Zp, define xn = x − n−1 i=1 xi mod p. Choose random ρx,1, . . . , ρx,n ∈ RC, define ρx = n i=1 ρx,i and Cx = Comm ck (x, ρx). Send [x]i = (xi, ρx,i, Cx) to party Pi. We denote this operation by [x] = Share(Pi, x, ρx). Open Secret: every party Pi broadcasts a share pair (x i , ρ x,i ). The parties compute the sums x , ρ x and check Comm ck (x , ρ x ) ? = Cx. If yes, output x = x , else output x =⊥. We denote this operation by x = Open([x] ). If just a party Pi should learn the output, we modify the above protocol in the sense that all parties send their shares to Pi, that verifies the correctness and outputs the result in the same way. We denote this operation by x = OpenTo (Pi, [x] ). Random Share: To generate a share of a random element r ∈R Zp, party Pi chooses at random (ri, ρr,i) ∈R Zp × RC and broadcast C i r = Comm ck (ri, ρr,i). Every party computes Cr = n i=1 C i r = Comm ck (r, ρr), where r = n i=1 ri, ρr = n i=1 ρr,i. Party Pi sets [r]i = (ri, ρr,i, Cr). We denote this operation by [r] = Rand(). The protocol implements FAMPC's commands in the following way:
Initialize: The parties invoke Frand(init, p) and store ck. Run the preprocessing as in Figure 10 to produce a big enough set of triplets. Rand: The parties invoke Frand(share, varid) and store the commitment [ 
Preprocessing
The main contribution of this paper is in the way the random triplets are generated. The task is to start from a strong semi-honest multiplication protocol as defined in Definition 3 and a dealer that provides random shared commitments as described in Figure 5 , and finish with a fully secure protocol that outputs triplets of multiplicative shared commitments. The main technical tool is a somewhat new and surprising application of packed Shamir's secret sharing [FY92] .
We start with a protocol to generate one triplets: the parties use π mul to compute cross products of their shares and broadcast commitments to their shares (details are given in Figure 9 ). This protocol is not secure Figure 9 . The protocol to generate one triplet Πtri against a malicious adversary (that could cheat in π mul or commit to inconsistent values): Intuitively to achieve full security we need the following: 1) the triplets are correct i.e. c = a · b, 2) the triplets are private i.e. a, b are uniformly random in the view of the adversary and 3) the adversary knows his shares of the shared commitments. The protocol, presented in Figure 10 will proceed in steps and ensure one property after the other. Note that in the protocol of Figure 10 every "distilled" triplets is the product of every produced triplets. This give a quadratic blow-up in local computation. A solution that might be more efficient in practice is to change the step Privacy as follows: instead of creating just one big polynomial, randomly partition the remaining triplets in subset of smaller size and use many polynomials of smaller degree. The analysis of this kind of approach can be found in [NO09] . Theorem 3. Let π mul be a strong semi-honest secure two-party multiplication protocol and Comm a double trapdoor homomorphic commitment scheme, then the protocol Π AMPC (κ, B log 2 (1 + λ) )-securely implements F AMPC in the F rand -hybrid model against any static, active adversary that corrupts any number of parties.
Remark: The statistical security of the protocol depends on both parameters B and λ. In practice one can set λ = 1/4 and B = 3.6s, so to get a protocol that is secure except with probability 2 −3.6 log 2 (5/4)s < 2 −s , where the total number of invocation to Π tri is now less than 5M + 18s.
Proof (sketch):
The simulator S AMPC simulates every call to F rand and keeps a copy of what the internal state of the corrupted parties should look like if they had followed the protocol. The simulator can do so as this state is uniquely determined by the output of F rand and the protocol execution. A description of the simulator is provided in Figure 11 .
The simulator SAMPC maintains at any point a copy of the shares of all parties (honest and corrupted).
Initialize:
The simulator runs (ck, τ1, τ2) ← Gen(1 κ ), gives ck to the parties, flips a coin b and stores τ = τ 1+b , and discards τ 2−b . Call init on the ideal functionality FAMPC. The simulator simulates the preprocessing by following the protocol in Figure 10 as an honest party would do, except that it reads the corrupted parties shares from Frand. Rand: Simulate the call to Frand by reading the corrupted parties shares and choose random ai, ri for the honest parties. Call rand on the ideal functionality FAMPC, and store internally the shares for all parties. Output: To simulate an output of [x] to Pi where i ∈ H, the simulator receives (x i , r i ) from all corrupted parties Pi, i ∈ C. Let (xi, ri) be the internal shares of the simulator corresponding to Pi. If i∈C xi = i∈C x i and i∈C ri = i∈C r i call output on the ideal functionality, otherwise abort the protocol. To simulate an output of [x] to Pi where i ∈ C, the simulator receives x from the ideal functionality, and the sum of the internal shares xi, ri is x, r, the opening of Cx. The simulator picks the smallest j ∈ H, executes r j = TOpen(xj, rj, xj + (x − x ), τ ) and sends (xj + (x − x ), r j ), and (xi, ri) for all i ∈ H, i = j to the adversary. Input: To simulate the call for Pi, with i ∈ C simulate the call to Frand as described above, and perform [x] = Shift(Pi, x, [a]) as the honest parties would do (check for the abort condition in Open as described before). Internally update all the parties shares. Given ∆ and a, compute x = ∆ + a mod p and input it in the ideal functionality FAMPC.
To simulate the call for Pi, with i ∈ H simulate the call to Frand as described above, and perform [x] = Shift(Pi, 0, [a]) (check for the abort condition in Open as described before). Internally update all the parties shares. Add: Run the protocol honestly and update all the internal shares and call add on the ideal functionality FAMPC. Multiply: Run the protocol honestly, updating all the internal shares (check for the abort condition in Open as described before). Call multiply on the ideal functionality FAMPC. Figure 11 . The simulator SAMPC On-line security: Define an hybrid game where the adversary is restricted to following the protocol during the preprocessing phase Π pre , and then behaves arbitrarily during the on-line phase. The view of the protocol (excluding the preprocessing) contains statistically no information about the actual values of the computation: every value that is opened in Input, Multiply is masked with fresh randomness, and the commitments are statistically hiding. Then the only way that the environment can distinguish between the real and the ideal execution is by forcing an output towards an honest party (or an input of a dishonest party) to be incorrect.
To do that, the adversary needs to send a set of shares (x i , r i ) with i ∈ C with x i = x i and such that Comm( x i ; r i ) = Comm( x i ; r i ), where (x i , r i ) are the simulator's internal shares for the corrupted parties. Using E in Definition 2 we can extract a trapdoor τ b * from these values. Given that the view of the simulated protocol is statistically independent of the trapdoor used by the simulator τ b , then Pr[b = b * ] = 1/2 and we can turn an adversary that distinguish the the real and the ideal world with probability 1/2 + q, q non negligible, into an adversary that break the security of the commitment scheme with non-negligible probability q/2, and we reach a contradiction.
Preprocessing security: For the sake of simplicity, let's assume n = 2, P 1 honest and P 2 corrupted 4 . The UC simulator runs the preprocessing protocol as the honest party would. If the corrupted party send values that would make a honest party abort, the simulator inputs abort to F AMPC on behalf of the corrupted party. If the simulator does not input abort to F AMPC , the simulator stores the corrupted party's shares of [a], [b], [c], namely (a 2 , r 2 , b 2 , s 2 , c 2 , t 2 ) that he learns during Proof of Knowledge (by simulating F rand ) and proceed to the on-line phase. The simulation of the preprocessing phase is perfect, as the simulator behaves exactly as an honest party. What remains to argue is that if the protocol did not abort at the end of the preprocessing phase, then the triplets are correct and the honest parties' shares are uniformly random in the adversary's view, even if the adversary is corrupted.
Note that Π tri securely produces random multiplicative triplets against a strong semi-honest adversary. In fact:
If A can cheat during Π tri and then pretend he didn't during Test it can be used to break either the strong semi-honest security of π mul or the binding property of Comm.
The step Test doesn't leak any information as it can be simulated as detailed in Lemma 6. We can use Lemma 5 to define a good triplet to be one where the adversary could open the triplet during Test and make an honest party accept, and a bad triplet otherwise. Note that the lemma uses rewinding techniques: this is fine, as we do not use the lemma to extract the adversary shares -we do this in Proof of Knowledge -but to prove that the simulation is correct. From the properties of π mul we know that for a good triplet c = a · b and a, b are random in the adversary's view except with negligible probability. Therefore after Test we know that (except with negligible probability) the number of bad triplets is bounded by some constant B except with probability (1 + λ) −B .
After the Correctness step, if the protocol doesn't abort the triplets are correct except with probability 1/p: let z = x · y + ∆ z mod p and c = a · b + ∆ c , then c − c = r 2 ∆ z − ∆ c that is = 0 if (∆ c , ∆ z ) = (0, 0) with probability 1 − 1/p over the choice of r. Then if the adversary doesn't break the binding property of Comm and c − c = 0 for any pair of triplets the protocol aborts.
In Privacy after the triplets are randomly partitioned, we know that the probability that there are more than B bad triplets left is less than (1 + λ) −B . Therefore the adversary knows less than B points on the polynomials F, G of degree d, so from Lagrange interpolation theory those polynomials have still M + 1 degrees of freedom in the adversary's view. So the adversary gains statistically no information about the newly generated M triplets [a ], [b ], [c ] and, even after M − 1 of those will be opened during the protocol, the last unopened triplet is still random in his view.
UC Commitment Scheme
In this section we show how to implement F rand . For the sake of simplicity, we present a two party protocol for UC commitments. In order to produce a random commitment between n parties as required by F rand it will suffice to let every party publish a commitment and, using the homomorphic properties of the commitment, sum them up.
The protocol generates many commitments at once in a preprocessing flavor and it is efficient in the sense that to construct M UC commitments with security s, one needs O(M + s) call to the primitivesthe efficiency of the protocol is roughly the efficiency of the primitives used.
The Fmcomm functionality is described by the following commands:
Activate: On input (activate) from all parties, the functionality replies (ready) to all parties and S, and start replying to other commands. Commit: On input (commit, cid, Pc, Pr, x) from party Pc output (committed, cid, Pc, Pr) to Pr and S if cid was not previously stored, otherwise ignore the message. We solve this by using the cut-and-choose approach to force honest behavior. First the committer selects at random two polynomials f and g of degree d = 2M +s−1 over Z p . Then the committer sends to the receiver commitments to 2M + 2s points on both polynomials using the semi-honest protocol. Now a random challenge is coin-flipped, in order to determine a subset of M + s commitments to be checked. The committer reveals the points and the randomness used in the semi-honest protocol to the receiver, who aborts if any opening is inconsistent. If the protocol doesn't abort we know that, with probability 1 − 2 −s , at least M out of the M + s unopened commitments are well-formed. Therefore the simulator learns the required 2M + s points that uniquely determine f : the first M + s are disclosed during the cut-and-choose, while the last M are extracted from the unopened (but well-formed) commitments. Also note that any M out of the M + s unopened points are still uniformly random in the view of the receiver.
In order for this to work, we need to ensure that f is of the right degree d (or the simulator will not have enough points to determine f ): to do so the receiver will send a random challenge w ∈ Z p and the committer will reveal h(i) = w · f (i) + g(i) for all i's. Thanks to the homomorphic properties of the commitment Comm the receiver can verify that the committer is not lying about these points, and he can check that h has degree most d. This implies, with probability 1 − 1/p, that f and g have degree at most d. In the test g is used to mask f , so that the points on f are still random to the receiver.
The protocol actually implements a random commitment functionality. If one wants to commit to specific messages it is always possible to derandomize the commitments (the committer simply sends the difference between the random committed value and the actual messages).
UC Commitments with Preprocessing
In Figure 13 the protocol for UC commitments with preprocessing is presented.
We write (Gen, Enc, Dec) for a semantically secure encryption scheme where (ek, dk) ← Gen(1 κ ) is the key generation algorithm, C = Enc ek (x, r) is an encryption of x using randomness r and given the decryption key dk is possible to recover the message x = Dec dk (C). Security is defined in the standard way. that the simulator receives from the ideal functionality. If the environment can distinguish, then it can be turned into an adversary that breaks semantic security of Enc using standard techniques.
In the more interesting case where the committer is corrupted, the proof follows the one of Theorem 3: we use Lemma 5 to define which pairs are good and which bad. After Cut-and-Choose the number of openings that the simulator cannot extract is bounded by s with probability 2 −s . Therefore the simulator can reconstruct the unique polynomial f (x) defined by the M + s point seen during Cut-and-Choose and the M points it can extract from the consistent pairs. Once the simulator knows f it can compute the a j 's for all j's. Therefore it can extract the committed messages in Commit by just computing m j = a j − ∆ j mod p. The only way for the environment can distinguish the real game from the simulated one is by forcing an opening to a message m j different from the one extracted by the simulator m j . Such an environment can be turned into one that break the binding property of Comm using standard techniques.
Multi-party case: It is possible to extend the protocol to the case of multi receivers by replacing the random choices of the receiver with a coin flip protocol. If one wants to allow multiple parties to play as committer, several modification to the protocol can be considered:
-Use a longer CRS that contains n key pairs (ck 1 , ek 1 ,. . .,ck n , ek n ), and every party commits using his own keys.
-If one wants to keep the CRS short, 1) Comm needs to be a double-trapdoor commitment scheme and 2) either one uses semantic secure encryption scheme, and require the preprocessing to run sequentially (at any given point just one party is acting as P c before Commit) or one can replace Enc with a CCA secure encryption -in this case different parties can all encrypt using the same public key and non-malleability is still guaranteed. The proof for the multi party protocol is essentially the same as the two-party case.
Cut-and-Choose Toolkit
In both the protocols presented in this paper we achieve security against a malicious adversary by using a kind of cut-and-choose reminiscent of the one first used in [NO09] . To make this paper self contained, we restate two useful lemmas: Let's just define a component to be the output of a one-way function f : X → Y: an image is good if the sender knows the preimage and bad if he doesn't. The structure of a cut-and-choose is shown in Figure 14 : we will argue the cut-and-choose can be efficiently simulated and if the adversary passes the test then most of the images are good. The first observation is that if the test goes through then there are at most B bad images between the unchecked ones, except with probability (1 + λ) −B . The expected running time is given by the probability that we start rewinding µ times the time that we spend doing the extraction. If µ < 2(1 + λ) −B , then the running time is bounded by µ · S = poly(s). If µ ≥ 2(1 + λ) −B , then the extractor stops with success after expected time S = 1+λ λ 2 µ M , and therefore the total expected running is µ · S = O(M ).
Lemma 6 (Simulation). For any honest P 2 there exist an expected poly-time simulator S for the test in Figure 14 s.t. the view of P 2 when interacting with an honest P 1 and the output of S are indistinguishable.
Proof: Consider the S that is given as input a set B of up to λM random images y i . S chooses a random challenge r and orders the y i 's in such a way that T ∩ B = ∅. Then S fills M with M random fresh images y i = f (x i ) for random x i . The produced view is distributed exactly as in the protocol.
Remarks: It is possible to simulate against malicious P * 2 , by replacing step 2 in Figure 14 with a coin flip protocol, and in particular an UC coin flip protocol leads to a UC simulator for the test. This means that running the test doesn't give P * 2 any advantage when he tries to invert the one way function on y i , i / ∈ T .
